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Prior executive compensation studies overlooked the endogeneity of firm performance and the simultaneity 
of managerial discretion, firm performance, and CEO pay. To overcome these two shortcomings, we propose 
a novel simultaneous equations system model to investigate the cause-and-effect relationships among 
research & development (R&D), advertising, firm performance, and CEO compensation, which are jointly 
affected by CEO’s tenure, age, ownership, firm size, risk, and industry. Although the feedback loops are positive 
between firm performance and CEO pay and between advertising and firm performance, the feedback loop is 
negative between R&D and firm performance. Firm size has a direct and indirect effect on R&D, advertising, 
firm performance, and CEO pay. Large firm size may entice CEOs to invest excessively in R&D, leading to poor 
performance and low pay. Our study implies that the positive relationship between firm performance and CEO 
pay depends upon the appropriateness of the strategic choices that CEOs make. 
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INTRODUCTION AND RELATED LITERATURE 
 
The relationship between firm performance and CEO compensation has been puzzling researchers for 
decades and there is still an ongoing debate on whether good firm performance leads to high CEO pay 
and what actually drives up CEO pay. As suggested in Lin and Shi (2020), there are two prominent 
competing theories that try to explain this relationship. The students of the optimal contracting school 
argue that CEO compensation is determined by both capital and labor markets, whereas the students 
of the managerial entrenchment school contend that CEO manipulates pay to serve one’s own self-
interests at the cost of shareholder value. Despite numerous studies were conducted on the 
relationship between firm performance and CEO compensation, findings were mixed (Frydman & 
Jenter, 2010). Kaplan (2008) found that CEOs were paid for good performance, while Tosi, Werner, 
Katz, and Gomez-Mejia (2000) discovered that the performance-pay relationship was rather weak in a 
meta-analysis. 
We identified two main reasons for such mixed findings and the shortcomings of prior studies. First, 
a simple sequential regression model might suffer from the endogeneity problem. Hambrick and 
Mason (1984) posited that CEO’s characteristics such as age, tenure, and experience could affect 
performance levels and strategic choices. Quigley and Hambrick (2015) found that the CEO effect on 




firm performance had become increasingly significant over the 60 years. Both these two studies reveal 
that a performance-pay model must consider the endogenous nature of firm performance for it to be 
robust.  
Second, the simultaneity of managerial discretion (e.g., research and development or R&D, 
advertising) (Finkelstein & Boyd, 1998; Scherer & Ross, 1990), firm performance, and CEO 
compensation has been overlooked, which are jointly influenced by such contextual criteria as CEO’s 
characteristics (e.g., age, tenure), behavior (e.g., ownership), firm size, and market condition (e.g., 
volatility) (Gomez-Mejia & Wiseman, 1997; Hambrick & Mason, 1984). Prior studies examined these 
endogenous variables R&D, advertising, firm performance, and CEO pay individually but not 
simultaneously.  
For example, Finkelstein and Boyd (1998) claimed that managerial discretion had a significant 
positive effect on CEO compensation. Shepherd (1972) discovered that high advertising intensity 
increased ROE. Using a fixed-effect OLS model, Lee (2009) found that there was no significance 
between advertising and firm’s return but positive significance between R&D and return and that firm 
size had a significant positive effect on firm performance. Beneda and Zhang (2011) observed that R&D 
reduced ROA for IPO firms in the long-run. Barker and Mueller (2002) noticed that younger CEOs 
invested more in R&D and that smaller firms spent more on R&D. Hirshleifer, Low, and Teoh (2012) 
uncovered that longer-tenured CEOs invested more in R&D. Kim and Lu (2011) argued that high 
ownership reduced firm value and that CEOs with high ownership were more risk-averse to the risky 
discretionary projects such as R&D. Hogan and McPheters (1980) contended that CEO’s age, tenure, 
and corporate sales positively led to higher CEO pay.  
So far, researchers have made a great deal of efforts to seek the empirical evidence for the 
relationships between CEO’s tenure and R&D intensity (Miller, 1991; Barker & Mueller, 2002), between 
CEO’s age and R&D intensity (Barker & Mueller, 2002), between CEO’s characteristics (e.g., age, 
tenure) and CEO compensation (Hogan & McPheters, 1980; Finkelstein & Boyd, 1998), between CEO 
ownership and firm value/performance (Kim & Lu, 2011; Lilienfeld-Toal & Ruenzi, 2014; Welbourne & 
Cyr, 1996), between firm size and R&D intensity (Barker & Mueller, 2002), between firm size and firm 
performance (Lee, 2009), between market risk (e.g., beta) and firm performance (Lee, 2009), between 
R&D intensity and firm performance (Lee, 2009; Beneda & Zhang, 2011; Yeh, Chu, Sher, & Chiu, 2010), 
between advertising intensity and firm performance (Shepherd, 1972; Lee, 2009), between firm 
performance and CEO compensation (Hogan & McPheters, 1980; Jensen & Murphy, 1990; Hall & 
Liebman, 1998; Finkelstein & Boyd, 1998; Tosi, et al., 2000; Kaplan, 2008), between firm size and CEO 
compensation (Finkelstein & Boyd, 1998), between CEO equity and CEO compensation (Finkelstein & 
Boyd, 1998), and between managerial discretion and CEO compensation (Finkelstein & Boyd, 1998). 
However, the models used to investigate these relationships are sequential with the assumption of 
direct casual relationships and the results presented are fragmented, mixed, inconclusive, and even 
contradictory to each other.  
Therefore, there lacks a coherent simultaneous equations system (SES) model not only to take the 
endogeneity of firm performance into account, but also to theoretically and empirically integrate R&D, 
advertising, firm performance, and CEO pay together as shown in Figure 1. This study overcomes the 
two shortcomings discussed above, thus making significant contributions to executive compensation, 
corporate governance, strategic management, business forecasting, and applied econometrics. 
Having conducted a thorough literature review on CEO compensation, Frydman and Jenter (2010) 
concluded that the causal effects of CEO pay on manager’s behavior and firm value are less than clear 
and still unknown. Recently, Lin and Shi (2020) proposed a seemingly unrelated regression (SUR) 
model to analyze the relationships among CEO pay, firm performance, and strategic coopetition. This 
recent publication is the first study that brings the causality-effect literature of CEO pay a step closer 
to simultaneity settings.  




Nevertheless, we believe that the simple direct causal relationships are insufficient to explain the 
complex nature of CEO compensation in a broader setting where the major effects on CEO 
compensation, namely, managerial discretion and firm performance, are simultaneously and jointly 
determined. In other words, there exists a causality dilemma, which comes first, CEO compensation or 
firm performance. This causality dilemma has led Smirnova and Zavertiaeva (2017) to treating CEO 
compensation and firm performance (proxied by ROA) as endogenous variables. Unfortunately, the 
authors failed to explicitly present their SES model and check the identification problem but instead 
report the 2SLS estimates (referred to as the 2SLS regression estimation results pp.669–670) based 
on a panel sample of 330 European firms over the time period from 2009 to 2013. The 2SLS results may 
yield misleading conclusions and implications (see Sections 4.4 and 4.5 below). Furthermore, it is 
unclear as to how they handled their panel data.  
The present study represents a major extension to the work by Smirnova and Zavertiaeva (2017) 
and the SUR study of Lin and Shi (2020) to fill the research gap revealed from our literature review. A 
comprehensive holistic SES model estimated by 3SLS method is needed to explain more complex 
cause-and-effect relationships among management-specific discretionary decisions, firm 
performance, and CEO compensation. The first and foremost contribution of this work is to integrate 
the optimal contracting theory (Kaplan, 2008), the managerial entrenchment theory (Jensen & 
Meckling, 1976; Shleifer & Vishny, 1989), and the upper echelon theory (Hambrick & Mason, 1984) in a 
simultaneous equations system (SES) framework in Sections 2 and 3. We theorize that CEOs utilize 
their tenure, age, ownership, and other legitimizing factors such as firm size, market risk, and the 
nature of the industry to affect firm performance as well as to make discretionary management-
specific decisions, which ultimately and indirectly influence the board of directors and their 
compensations. The second contribution of this paper is to use a SES model to examine the 
simultaneous relationships between R&D intensity and firm performance, between advertising 
intensity and firm performance, and between firm performance and CEO compensation, which are 
jointly affected by the contextual criteria (e.g., CEO’s tenure, age, ownership, firm size, volatility, 
industry) as outlined by Gomez-Mejia and Wiseman (1997) and Lin and Shi (2020) in Section 4. The third 
contribution of this study is to show that the 3SLS estimation is more accurate and efficient compared 
to 2SLS and OLS, and thus is the appropriate method for estimating a SES model in Sections 5 and 6.    
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 reviews the extant CEO pay and upper 
management theories and explore research opportunities. Section 3 is devoted to theoretical 
framework and hypotheses development and Section 4 to the theories, research models and 
estimation methods. Section 5 presents the data used, measurement of variables, an analysis of the 
data, and empirical results. Section 6 discusses the results and managerial implications. Finally, Section 




Three prominent extant theories, namely, optimal contracting theory, managerial entrenchment 
theory, and upper echelon theory, have examined CEO compensation and the effect of CEO on 
organizational outcomes. Based on the optimal contracting theory, Kaplan (2008) argues that CEO pay 
has to be determined by firm performance and other market conditions (i.e., both economic and labor 
market) to properly align CEO’s financial interests with firm’s revenues and strategic goals. However, 
the optimal contracting theory tends to overemphasize the importance of firm performance, while 
underestimate CEO’s power play or political games to influence the board of directors and 
subsequently CEO pay.  
Opposing the optimal contracting theory, Jensen and Meckling (1976) and Shleifer and Vishny 
(1989) point out that CEOs are able to manipulate their compensations utilizing managerial power such 




as tenure, age, ownership and legitimizing factors such as firm size and market risk to demand for 
higher pay, and that CEOs make manager-specific investments not necessarily to improve firm 
performance but instead to make themselves hard and costly to get replaced. Although the 
managerial entrenchment or power theory is able to explain why the relationship between firm 
performance and CEO pay is weak (Tosi, et al., 2000), it overlooks the endogenous nature of firm 
performance, that is, firm performance can be a dependent variable according to the upper echelon 
theory (Hambrick & Mason, 1984) and it overemphasizes CEO’s manipulation of firm performance 
whereas underestimates the significance of market influences.  
To undertake a more balanced approach by considering both the optimal contracting theory and 
managerial entrenchment theory, Gabaix and Landier (2008), Smirnova and Zavertiaeva (2017), and 
Lin and Shi (2020) treat the variables related to firm performance, CEO characteristics, and firm 
attributes as the main explanatory variables or determinants of CEO pay. However, like the optimal 
contracting theory and the managerial entrenchment theory, the shortcoming of this mixed approach 
is the underlying assumption of direct causal effect of the pay determinants on CEO compensation. 
This simple assumption can be challenged by the upper echelon theory (Hambrick & Mason, 1984) that 
argues that the organizational outcomes and firm performance are affected by upper management’s 
tenure, age, ownership, firm size, market risk, and other CEO and firm attributes. In other words, CEOs 
influence their compensations indirectly instead of directly. 
Therefore, the weaknesses in the extant CEO pay theories as reviewed above motivate us to 
integrate the optimal contracting theory, the managerial entrenchment theory, and the upper echelon 
theory to better explain how CEOs are able to affect their compensations, how CEO pay is determined 
and what drive up the CEO pay. We feel that a non-sequential or indirect model, for instance, a 
simultaneous equations system (SES) model would fill the research gap assuming that the effects of 
pay determinants on CEO compensation are indirect and more sophisticated compared to the optimal 
contracting theory and the managerial entrenchment theory alone. The upper echelon serves as the 



























THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK AND HYPOTHESES 
 
 
























Table 1. Definitions of, and Instruments for Measuring, the Endogenous and Exogenous Variables 
Studied 
Variable 
Symbol Definition Instrument (Reference) 
TCi The total CEO compensation of firm i Kaplan (2008); Tosi et al. (2000) 
ROAi 
Return on asset (a proxy used to measure 
firm performance) 
Finkelstein & Boyd (1998); Lin & Chiang 
(2011); Adam (2008) 
RDi 
R&D intensity of firm i (measured by the 
ratio of R&D expenditure to sales) Finkelstein & Boyd (1998); Lee (2009)  
ADi 
Advertising intensity of firm i (measured 
by the ratio of advertising expenditure to 
sales) 
Shepherd (1972); Finkelstein & Boyd (1998); 
Lee (2009) 
TENi 
CEO’s tenure in years (measured by the 
number of years hired as the CEO of firm 
i) 
Hogan & McPheters (1980); Miller (1991); 
Finkelstein & Boyd (1998); Barker & Mueller 
(2002)  
NSAi 
Net sales, annual (a proxy of the firm size 
of firm i) Finkelstein & Boyd (1998); Lee (2009) 
VOLi 
Market risk or volatility (measured by the 
beta of firm i) Lee (2009) 
OWNi 
CEO’s ownership (the value of shares 
owned by the CEO of firm i) 
Kim & Lu (2011); Lilienfeld-Toal & Ruenzi 
(2014); Welbourne & Cyr (1996) 
AGEi CEO’s age of firm i (measured in years) 
Hogan & McPheters (1980); Barker & Mueller 
(2002) 
INDi An industry control variable  A control variable  
Note: TCi, ROAi, RDi, and ADi are the jointly dependent or endogenous variables, while TENi, NSAi, VOLi, OWNi, AGEi, INDi 
are the exogenous variables.  
 
Figure 1 presents our theoretical framework and Table 1 lists the definitions of the variables we 
implement in the simultaneous CEO compensation model. We theorize that CEOs utilize their tenure, 
age, ownership, and other legitimizing factors such as firm size, market risk, and the nature of the 
industry to affect firm performance as well as to make discretionary management-specific decisions, 
which ultimately and indirectly to influence the board of directors and their compensations as shown 
in Figure 1. The major contribution of this model is the new assumption of covert influential power of 
CEO on firm performance and management-specific decisions along with the intertwining 
simultaneous relationships among management-specific decisions, firm performance, and CEO pay. 
Our theory improves but diverges from both the optimal contracting theory proposing that CEO pay 
should be determined directly by firm performance and the managerial entrenchment theory arguing 
that CEO’s power or political play on management-specific discretionary decisions outweighs firm 
performance in determining CEO compensation.  
Here, we state the reasons for employing the variables studied in our SES model. Gomez-Mejia and 
Wiseman (1997) contended that it was crucial to study CEO compensation by considering those 
contextual criteria, namely, CEO’s characteristics, manager’s behavior, firm’s attributes, and market 
condition. The upper echelon theory proposed by Hambrick and Mason (1984) suggested that CEO’s 
characteristics had significant impact on firm performance (or organizational outcome). Additionally, 
Barker and Mueller (2002) demonstrated that CEO’s characteristics affected managerial discretion 
such as R&D expenditure. Following the progression made by prior research, this study considers six 
important contextual criteria: CEO’s tenure (TEN), age (AGE), ownership (OWN), firm size (NSA), 
industry (IND), and market risk (VOL). In this paper, we assume that ownership is exogenously 




determined (Morck, Shleifer, & Vishny, 1988; McConnell & Servaes, 1990), which is consistent with 
both the agency theory of incentive alignment (Jensen & Meckling, 1976) and the rent extraction 
theory (Stulz, 1988). However, it should be noted that the assumption of ownership can also be 
endogenous (Demsetz & Lehn, 1985; Himmelberg, Hubbard, & Palia, 1999), depending on the research 
questions and objectives.  
Finkelstein and Boyd (1998) identified seven important indicators for measuring managerial 
discretions: market growth (Boyd, 1990), R&D intensity and advertising intensity (used to evaluate 
product differentiability) (Scherer & Ross, 1990), demand instability (Boyd, 1990), capital intensity, 
concentration (industry structure) (Boyd, 1990; Schmalensee, 1977), and regulation. This paper 
considers two important factors: R&D intensity and advertising intensity, which are the most 
prominent and relevant to studying CEO compensation and CEO’s decision as discussed in Section 1. 
In the follow sections, we explain each relationship in the simultaneous CEO compensation model (see 
Figure 1) one-by-one. 
 
THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN CEO’S TENURE AND R&D INTENSITY 
 
Hambrick and Fukotomi (1991) argue that CEO power on the board increases during the passage of 
time from cumulative success, good track record, and significant amount of stock options. Miller, 
Vries, and Toulouse (1982) argue that high tenure gives CEOs enough time to influence the 
organizational structure and environment. Shleifer and Vishny (1989) assert that longer tenure grants 
CEOs more discretions on manager-specific investments which are not necessarily value-maximizing 
but to make CEOs much costlier to be replaced, and hence enable CEOs to entrench themselves. 
Therefore, it is hypothesized that:  
 
Hypothesis 1A (H1A). R&D intensity (RD) increases as CEO’s tenure (TEN) increases.  
 
On the contrary, the stability and status quo enjoyed by the CEOs who stay longer in the 
organization makes them less likely to embrace changes and innovation (Hambrick & Mason, 1984). 
Moreover, longer tenure may prohibit CEOs from expanding the business and making risky decisions 
necessary to evolve the organization (Miller, 1991; Barker & Mueller, 2002). Thus, the alternative 
hypothesis is given by:  
 
Hypothesis 1B (H1B). R&D intensity (RD) decreases as CEO’s tenure (TEN) increases. 
 
THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN FIRM SIZE AND R&D INTENSITY  
 
According to the resource-based view, larger firms invest more in R&D than smaller firms do. 
Schumpeter (1942) argues that larger firms have sufficient resources and more market power to 
innovate and protect their investments from immediate imitation. Galbraith (1952) contends that 
larger firms are more capable of taking on the risk and time associated with a R&D project. Arrow 
(1962) asserts that smaller firms have less incentives for innovation because of the lack of financial 
resources, the difficulty in protecting the property rights after commercialization, and the high risk of 
failure and imitation. Hence, we hypothesize that:  
 
Hypothesis 2A (H2A). R&D intensity (RD) increases as firm size (NSA) increases.  
 




Barker and Mueller (2002) put forward a counter argument that uncertain and risky R&D spending 
may disturb the status quo of a strong market place the larger size had created. Then, the alternative 
hypothesis states that:  
 
Hypothesis 2B (H2B). R&D intensity (RD) decreases as firm size (NSA) increases. 
 
THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN MARKET RISK AND R&D INTENSITY 
 
R&D projects typically involve huge risk and more failures (Perlitz, Peske, & Schrank, 2002), thus low 
market risk or volatility would give firms more incentives to innovate. CEOs are more likely to take on 
risky propositions when the risks are low. Accordingly, we are interested in testing:  
 
Hypothesis 3 (H3). R&D intensity (RD) increases as market risk (VOL) decreases. 
 
THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN CEO’S OWNERSHIP AND FIRM PERFORMANCE 
 
Agency theorists (Tosi & Gomez-Mejia, 1994) claim that CEO ownership serves as an incentive 
alignment mechanism that closely ties agent’s (CEO’s) interests with principle’s (stakeholder’s) 
interests, and hence to mitigate the classic agency problems. By design, CEOs will unlikely to take on 
highly risky projects and will make more rational business decisions in order to keep their job. In theory, 
when companies perform well on the market, CEOs will benefit from owning more shares and 
stakeholders will profit from strategic superiority. A recent study by Lilienfeld-Toal and Ruenzi (2014) 
shows that substantial CEO ownership (e.g., more than 10% of outstanding shares) leads to higher firm 
value. Consequently, it calls for testing:  
 
Hypothesis 4A (H4A). Firm performance (ROA) increases as CEO ownership (OWN) increases. 
 
On the contrary, Jensen and Meckling (1976) argue that CEOs are able to entrench themselves 
through higher ownership that gives them significant power and control over the board. Shleifer and 
Vishny (1989) argue that entrenched managers tend to make investments which are not value-
maximizing but simply make the managers appear to be valuable to the shareholders. Welbourne and 
Cyr (1996) find that high levels of CEO ownership hinder performance for firms at all levels of risk. 
Consequently, it also calls for testing:  
 
Hypothesis 4 (H4B). Firm performance (ROA) decreases as CEO ownership (OWN) increases. 
 
THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN CEO’S AGE AND ADVERTISING INTENSITY 
 
The upper echelons theory of Hambrick and Mason (1984) posit that younger managers are likely to 
generate greater growth (Child, 1974; Hart & Mellons, 1970) and variability in profit than their older 
counterparts do. Shepherd (1972) discovers that intensive advertising significantly drives up firm’s 
return in profit. As such, we propose to test:   
 









THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN FIRM PERFORMANCE AND R&D INTENSITY 
 
High performance may give managers a sense of success which in turn boosts CEO’s confidence to 
pursue risky projects. In fact, Hirshleifer, Low, and Teoh (2012) discover that overconfident CEOs spend 
more on R&D and have higher return on innovation. High performance may also convince CEOs that 
they are in better control of their firms which in turn promotes risk-taking behavior. Based on the 
congruence theory (Nightingale & Toulouse, 1977), Miller, Vries, and Toulouse (1982) argue that the 
internal managers, who believe their own actions affect the organizational outcomes, are more likely 
to innovate. The above analyses suggest to test:  
 
Hypothesis 6A (H6A). R&D intensity (RD) increases as firm performance (ROA) increases.  
 
On the other hand, Cyert and March (1963) contend that low-performing firms are inclined to 
engage in innovation hoping that it can boost stagnated performance. Thus, the alternative 
hypothesis to be tested is described by:   
 
Hypothesis 6B (H6B). R&D intensity (RD) increases as firm performance (ROA) decreases. 
 
THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN FIRM PERFORMANCE AND ADVERTISING INTENSITY 
 
In order for firms to be at a superior market position, product differentiation is required (Lee, 2009). 
Shepherd (1972) argues that high advertising intensity is one of the sources for product 
differentiability and a market barrier factor for profitability. Therefore, it is hypothesized that:  
 
Hypothesis 7 (H7). Advertising intensity (AD) increases as firm performance (ROA) increases. 
 
THE EFFECTS OF R&D INTENSITY AND ADVERTISING INTENSITY ON FIRM PERFORMANCE 
 
According to Amato and Wilder (1985), Mueller (1990), Amato and Amato (2004), Bain (1956), and Lee 
(2009), entry barriers such as advertising and R&D expenditures significantly increase the degree of 
market power and subsequently profitability. The theory implies that the more the company spends 
on R&D and advertising spending, the more likely it is going to deter the new competitors from 
entering the existing market, who are lack of sufficient financial resources to be at a competitive 
position. Hence, two hypotheses are established as follows:  
 
Hypothesis 8 (H8). Firm performance (ROA) increases as R&D activity intensifies (RD).  
 
Hypothesis 9 (H9). Firm performance (ROA) increases as advertising activity intensifies (AD).  
 
THE IMPACT OF CEO’S PAY ON FIRM PERFORMANCE 
 
According to the two-factor theory or the Herzberg, Mausner, and Snyderman’s (1959) motivation-
hygiene theory, low hygiene such as low pay can cause many complaints at the workplace, in general, 
dissatisfaction with the job. Maslow (1943, 1954) argues that five needs (e.g., physiological, safety, 
love, esteem, and self-actualization) motivate people. Since CEO compensation data are publicly 
available, inadequate or uncompetitive pay can make CEOs feel less confident about their job 
performance and hence less respected by their peers. The Hawthorne effect (Gillespie, 1991; Mayo, 
1946, 1975; Roethlisberger & Dickson, 1939) also applies here. Well paid CEOs feel being paid more 




attention by their upper management, and therefore work much harder. The expectancy theory posits 
that people behave accordingly to what they are expecting (Vroom, 1964; Oliver, 1974). Thus, it is 
probable that CEOs will work much harder if they are expecting a pay raise. Since such expectation is 
based on the past record of pay, low pay demotivates CEOs, and consequently lead to productivity 
deficiency. Drawing from those psychology theories of motivation, we expect that well paid CEOs will 
be more content with their job, be more productive, and thus generate higher firm performance. 
Therefore, we hypothesize that:  
 
Hypothesis 10 (H10). Firm performance (ROA) increases as CEO pay (TC) increases. 
 
THE INFLUENCE OF FIRM PERFORMANCE ON CEO’S PAY 
 
The agency theorists argue that CEO pay has to be strongly tied to firm performance in order to reflect 
shareholders’ best interests and deter any divergent behavior from a CEO (Tosi & Gomez-Mejia, 1989). 
In fact, Kaplan (2008) finds the evidence that CEOs are indeed paid for performance, but not efficiently 
due to market inefficiency. Lin and Shi’s (2020) seemingly unrelated regression (SUR) model indicates 
that the peer-pay bias is one of the reasons for pay inefficiency. Thus, a final hypothesis to be tested is 
given by:   
 
Hypothesis 11 (H11). CEO pay (TC) increases as firm performance (ROA) increases.  
 




There are two competing theories of CEO compensation (Lin & Shi, 2020): (i) The theory of managerial 
entrenchment theorizes that CEO pay is affected by CEO’s managerial power (Jensen & Meckling, 
1976; Shleifer & Vishny, 1989) such as tenure, ownership, and age as well as legitimizing factors (Tosi, 
Jr. & Gomez-Mejia, 1989, providing an agency theory perspective) such as firm size and market risk; 
and (ii) the theory of optimized contracting (Kaplan, 2008) theorizes that CEO pay is determined by 
firm performance measured by return on asset (ROA), sales, net income, etc. as well as by competitive 
labor market. A hybridity theory (Gabaix & Landier, 2008; Smirnova & Zavertiaeva, 2017; Lin & Shi, 2020; 
among others) was born as a mixture of the above two theories. The research methods and models 
developed and constructed based upon these theories are sequential, with assumed direct causal-
effect relationships (with CEO pay as the effect or dependent variable), including regression models 
and SUR approach (Lin & Shi, 2020).  
The problem of the so-called endogeneity may arise from the applications of the direct causal-effect 
models (Zellner & Theil, 1962; Theil, 1971; Wu, 1973; Hausman, 1978; Kmenta, 1997; Greene, 2012). One 
of the resolution of the endogeneity problem calls for simultaneity, that is, the construction of a 
simultaneous equations system (SES) based on the theoretical foundations as described above to 
examine the simultaneously determined relationships among CEO compensations, firm performance, 
R&D intensity, and advertising intensity. The literature of CEO pays has overlooked the problem of 
endogeneity and the need to pay attention to the simultaneity nature of CEO pays, firm performance, 
and other variables. To bridge this research gap, we propose a SES which is composed of two 








THE STRUCTURAL FORM 
 
The coefficients of the structural form of the SES is used to test the hypotheses developed from the 
theoretical simultaneous CEO compensation model (see Figure 1) as described in the preceding 
section. Here, we present the structural form as follows: 
  
𝑇𝑇𝐶𝐶𝑖𝑖 = 𝛽𝛽10 + 𝛽𝛽11𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝐴𝐴𝑖𝑖 + 𝜀𝜀1𝑖𝑖                                                     (4.1) 
 
𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝐴𝐴𝑖𝑖 = 𝛽𝛽20 + 𝛽𝛽21𝑇𝑇𝐶𝐶𝑖𝑖 + 𝛽𝛽22𝑅𝑅𝐷𝐷𝑖𝑖 + 𝛽𝛽23𝐴𝐴𝐷𝐷𝑖𝑖 + 𝛽𝛽24𝑅𝑅𝑂𝑂𝑁𝑁𝑖𝑖 + 𝜀𝜀2𝑖𝑖                                  (4.2) 
 
𝑅𝑅𝐷𝐷𝑖𝑖 = 𝛽𝛽30 + 𝛽𝛽31𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝐴𝐴𝑖𝑖 + 𝛽𝛽32𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑁𝑁𝑖𝑖 + 𝛽𝛽33𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝐴𝐴𝑖𝑖 + 𝛽𝛽34𝑉𝑉𝑅𝑅𝐿𝐿𝑖𝑖 + 𝜀𝜀3𝑖𝑖                                 (4.3) 
 
𝐴𝐴𝐷𝐷𝑖𝑖 = 𝛽𝛽40 + 𝛽𝛽41𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝐴𝐴𝑖𝑖 + 𝛽𝛽42𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝑇𝑇𝑖𝑖 + 𝛽𝛽43𝐼𝐼𝑁𝑁𝐷𝐷𝑖𝑖 + 𝜀𝜀4𝑖𝑖                                    (4.4) 
 
where 1,...,i m=  and m is the sample size of firms.  
 
The structural model, Eqs. (4.1) – (4.4), involves ten (10) variables. Four (𝑇𝑇𝐶𝐶𝑖𝑖, 𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝐴𝐴𝑖𝑖, 𝑅𝑅𝐷𝐷𝑖𝑖, 𝐴𝐴𝐷𝐷𝑖𝑖) of 
them are the endogenous (jointly dependent) variables, while the other six variables (𝑅𝑅𝑂𝑂𝑁𝑁𝑖𝑖, 𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑁𝑁𝑖𝑖, 
𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝐴𝐴𝑖𝑖, 𝑉𝑉𝑅𝑅𝐿𝐿𝑖𝑖, 𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝑇𝑇𝑖𝑖 , and 𝐼𝐼𝑁𝑁𝐷𝐷𝑖𝑖) are the exogenous variables. The definitions of those ten variables are 
included in Table 1 for easy reference. Here, we provide a summary of their brief definitions: 𝑇𝑇𝐶𝐶𝑖𝑖= the 
total of CEO compensation of firm i, 𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝐴𝐴𝑖𝑖= return on asset, 𝑅𝑅𝐷𝐷𝑖𝑖= R&D intensity, 𝐴𝐴𝐷𝐷𝑖𝑖= advertising 
intensity, 𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑁𝑁𝑖𝑖= the CEO’s tenure, 𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝐴𝐴𝑖𝑖= annual net sales, 𝑉𝑉𝑅𝑅𝐿𝐿𝑖𝑖= market volatility, 𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝑇𝑇𝑖𝑖= the CEO’s 
age, 𝑅𝑅𝑂𝑂𝑁𝑁𝑖𝑖= the CEO’s ownership, and 𝐼𝐼𝑁𝑁𝐷𝐷𝑖𝑖= industry representing a control variable.  
We now turn to explaining the relationship of each explanatory variable in each equation of the 
structural form with the dependent (endogenous) variable. First, Eq. (4.1) is based on the theory of 
optimal contracting by assuming that 𝑇𝑇𝐶𝐶𝑖𝑖 is linearly related to the firm’s performance that with proxy 
by the firm’s 𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝐴𝐴𝑖𝑖, but that 𝑇𝑇𝐶𝐶𝑖𝑖 is simultaneously and jointly determined with 𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝐴𝐴𝑖𝑖. As such, there is 
no exogenous variable involving in Eq. (4.1). 
Second, Eq. (4.2) specifies that 𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝐴𝐴𝑖𝑖  is linearly impacted by the explanatory (exogenous) variable, 
𝑅𝑅𝑂𝑂𝑁𝑁𝑖𝑖  and three jointly dependent (endogenous) variables i.e., 𝑇𝑇𝐶𝐶𝑖𝑖, 𝑅𝑅𝐷𝐷𝑖𝑖, and 𝐴𝐴𝐷𝐷𝑖𝑖, but that 𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝐴𝐴𝑖𝑖  is 
simultaneously determined with these three dependent variables.  
Third, Eq. (4.3) depicts that the dependent variable,𝑅𝑅𝐷𝐷𝑖𝑖, is linearly effected by three explanatory 
(exogenous) variables, namely, 𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑁𝑁𝑖𝑖, 𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝐴𝐴𝑖𝑖, and 𝑉𝑉𝑅𝑅𝐿𝐿𝑖𝑖, and that 𝑅𝑅𝐷𝐷𝑖𝑖 is jointly determined with 𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝐴𝐴𝑖𝑖. 
Fourth (final), Eq. (4.4) establishes that the dependent variable,𝐴𝐴𝐷𝐷𝑖𝑖, is linearly affected by two 
explanatory (exogenous) variables, that is, 𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝑇𝑇𝑖𝑖  and 𝐼𝐼𝑁𝑁𝐷𝐷𝑖𝑖, but that 𝐴𝐴𝐷𝐷𝑖𝑖 is simultaneously and jointly 
determined with 𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝐴𝐴𝑖𝑖. 
To sum up, the structural form is designed to examine the simultaneous relationships between CEO 
compensations and firm performance (Eqs. 4.1 and 4.2) as viewed by the optimal contracting theory, 
between R&D intensity and firm performance (Eq. 4.3), and between advertising intensity and firm 
performance (Eq. 4.4). The SES model also incorporates several exogenous variables suggested by the 
managerial entrenchment theorists, such as CEO’s tenure, ownership, and age, as well as market risk 
and firm size with proxy by annual net sales.  
In the structural form (4.1) – (4.4), CEO’s characteristics (tenure or TEN; age or AGE), managerial 
behavior (ownership or OWN), firm size (with proxy by sales or NSA), firm’s attribute (industry or IND), 
and firm market condition (volatility or VOL) are the chosen exogenous variables of the model. CEO 
compensation (TC), firm performance (proxy by the return on assets or ROA), and the manager’s 
discretionary decisions (R&D or RD; advertising or AD) are the jointly-determined endogenous 




variables that are simultaneously determined and interdependent. Thus, there are four equations in 
the system because there are four jointly-determined endogenous variables.  
The relationships among the hypotheses presented in the theoretical simultaneous CEO 
compensation model and the associated coefficients of the structural form are summarized in Table 
2, where the dependent variables are highlighted in bold and the independent variables are presented 
in normal font. 
 
Table 2. Relationships Among Hypotheses and Structural Coefficients 
Relationship Hypothesis Coefficient Sign 
CEO’s tenure (TEN)    
R&D intensity (RD) H1A / H1B 𝛽𝛽32 +/− 
Firm’s annual sales (NSA)    
R&D intensity (RD) H2A / H2B 𝛽𝛽33 +/− 
Market risk (VOL)    
R&D intensity (RD) H3 𝛽𝛽34 −  
CEO ownership (OWN)    
Firm performance (ROA) H4A / H4B 𝛽𝛽24 +/− 
CEO’s age (AGE)    
Advertising intensity (AD) H5 𝛽𝛽42 − 
R&D intensity (RD)    
Firm performance (ROA) H6A / H6B 𝛽𝛽31 +/− 
Advertising intensity (AD)    
Firm performance (ROA) H7 𝛽𝛽41 +  
Firm performance (ROA)    
R&D intensity (RD) H8 𝛽𝛽22 + 
Advertising intensity (AD) H9 𝛽𝛽23 + 
Firm performance (ROA)    
CEO compensation (TC) H10 𝛽𝛽21 + 
CEO compensation (TC)    




An equation is identified if its statistical form is unique, which allows the parameters to be estimated 
from the sample. An equation is under-identified if its statistical form is not unique. An equation is 
either over-identified or exactly-identified if it is not under-identified (Lin & Shao, 2000). In order for 
the SES to be identified and estimated, the equations in the system must be identified (i.e., either over-
identified or just-identified). The rule of identification is that the number of exogenous variable(s) in 
an equation extracted (or excluded) from the total number of exogenous variables in the SES must be 
greater than (over-identification) or equal to (exact-identification) the number of endogenous 
variables included in the equation minus 1. For a system to be identified (over- or just-identified), all 
the equations in the system must be identified. This order condition is satisfied if an equation can be 
properly identified (Goldberger, 1964; Kmenta, 1997; Greene, 2012).  




Applying the identification rule to Eqs. (4.1) – (4.4) of the proposed SES, we find that Eqs. (4.1) – 
(4.4) are over-identified. None of the equations in the system is under-identified. Therefore, there is 
no identification problem.  
 
THE REDUCED FORM AND THE RELATIONSHIP WITH THE STRUCTURAL FORM 
 
We can derive the reduced form from the structural form by a series of mathematical and matrix 
operations (see Goldberger, 1964; Kmenta, 1997; Lin and Shao, 2000; Greene, 2012). The reduced form 
is composed of Eqs. (4.5) – (4.8), the counterparts of the structural form Eqs. (4.1) – (4.4):  
 
𝑇𝑇𝐶𝐶𝑖𝑖 = 𝜋𝜋10 + 𝜋𝜋11𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑁𝑁𝑖𝑖 + 𝜋𝜋12𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝐴𝐴𝑖𝑖 + 𝜋𝜋13𝑉𝑉𝑅𝑅𝐿𝐿𝑖𝑖 + 𝜋𝜋14𝑅𝑅𝑂𝑂𝑁𝑁𝑖𝑖 + 𝜋𝜋15𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝑇𝑇𝑖𝑖 + 𝜋𝜋16𝐼𝐼𝑁𝑁𝐷𝐷𝑖𝑖 +𝑤𝑤1  (4.5) 
 
𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝐴𝐴𝑖𝑖 = 𝜋𝜋20 + 𝜋𝜋21𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑁𝑁𝑖𝑖 + 𝜋𝜋22𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝐴𝐴𝑖𝑖 + 𝜋𝜋23𝑉𝑉𝑅𝑅𝐿𝐿𝑖𝑖 + 𝜋𝜋24𝑅𝑅𝑂𝑂𝑁𝑁𝑖𝑖 + 𝜋𝜋25𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝑇𝑇𝑖𝑖 + 𝜋𝜋26𝐼𝐼𝑁𝑁𝐷𝐷𝑖𝑖 + 𝑤𝑤2 (4.6) 
 
𝑅𝑅𝐷𝐷𝑖𝑖 = 𝜋𝜋30 + 𝜋𝜋31𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑁𝑁𝑖𝑖 + 𝜋𝜋32𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝐴𝐴𝑖𝑖 + 𝜋𝜋33𝑉𝑉𝑅𝑅𝐿𝐿𝑖𝑖 + 𝜋𝜋34𝑅𝑅𝑂𝑂𝑁𝑁𝑖𝑖 + 𝜋𝜋35𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝑇𝑇𝑖𝑖 + 𝜋𝜋36𝐼𝐼𝑁𝑁𝐷𝐷𝑖𝑖 + 𝑤𝑤3 (4.7) 
 
𝐴𝐴𝐷𝐷𝑖𝑖 = 𝜋𝜋40 + 𝜋𝜋41𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑁𝑁𝑖𝑖 + 𝜋𝜋42𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝐴𝐴𝑖𝑖 + 𝜋𝜋43𝑉𝑉𝑅𝑅𝐿𝐿𝑖𝑖 + 𝜋𝜋44𝑅𝑅𝑂𝑂𝑁𝑁𝑖𝑖 + 𝜋𝜋45𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝑇𝑇𝑖𝑖 + 𝜋𝜋46𝐼𝐼𝑁𝑁𝐷𝐷𝑖𝑖 +𝑤𝑤4 (4.8) 
 
Each of the Eqs. (4.5) – (4.8) indicates that a jointly-determined endogenous variable depends on 
all of the pre-determined exogenous variables and a random error. Therefore, we can find the total 
effect (sum of the reduced-form coefficient estimates) of the exogenous contextual criteria variables 
on an endogenous variable (Lin and Shao, 2000). 
 
ESTIMATION PROBLEM AND METHODS: OLS VS. 2SLS VS. 3SLS 
 
In an equation of the SES models, an endogenous variable appears as an independent variable. Then, 
it can be shown that the expected value of the product of the endogenous variable and the equation’s 
random error is not equal to zero because the endogenous variable and the random error are 
correlated or not independent. As an illustrative example, in Eq. (4.1), it can be proved that 
𝑇𝑇(𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝐴𝐴𝑖𝑖𝜀𝜀1𝑖𝑖) ≠ 0, raising a serious problem called endogeneity.  
Consequently, it is invalid to estimate the SES by using the ordinary least squares (OLS), because 
the OLS estimates of the structural coefficients are biased and inconsistent due to the problem of 
endogeneity caused by the simultaneity bias or simultaneous-equation bias (Koutsoyiannis, 1977; 
Kmenta, 1997; Lin & Shao, 2000). Therefore, the two-stage least squares (2SLS) and the three-stage 
least squares (3SLS) methods have to be applied. The former is a single-equation method applied to 
estimate each individual equation in the SES, while the latter is a complete system method applied to 
estimate the whole SES (i.e., all the equations in the SES simultaneously). It has been established 
theoretically and empirically that 3SLS is more efficient than 2SLS (e.g., Kmenta, 1997; Lin, 1987, 1992; 
Lin and Shao, 2000). As such, the use of the 2SLS estimates to draw the conclusions represents a 
serious draw back of the work by Smirnova and Zavertiaeva (2017).  
According to Zellner and Theil (1962), 3SLS is asymptotically more accurate, optimal, and efficient 
than 2SLS when the cross-equation random errors are correlated (i.e., 𝑇𝑇(𝜀𝜀𝑗𝑗𝜀𝜀𝑘𝑘) ≠ 0, for 𝑗𝑗,𝑘𝑘 ∈ {1,2,3,4} 
and 𝑗𝑗 ≠ 𝑘𝑘). The assumption of such correlations among the random errors (or the so-called 
contemporaneous correlations) differs 3SLS from 2SLS. The cross-equation random errors could be 
correlated if other possible exogenous variables are unintentionally omitted from the simultaneous 
CEO compensation model, leaving the effects of those omitted variables to be absorbed by the 
random errors and making the random errors correlated.  
 








We collected our sample data from Execucomp Annual Compensation (Compustat quarterly updates), 
Execucomp Company Financial–Fundamentals Annual of North America (Compustat Monthly 
Updates), and Beta Deciles of Stock/Portfolio Assignments (The Center for Research in Security Prices 
or CRSP). The database is provided by the Wharton Research Data Services (WRDS). The firms that 
considered the strategic choices, namely, R&D and advertising in 2013 were chosen for our sample. 
The sampled firms also include those that considered R&D and advertising but decided not to spend 
on R&D and/or advertising in 2013. The sample would be biased if those firms were not included. We 
took the following steps to narrow down the sample firms. First, the firms with no or incomplete 
information on CEO compensation (TC), return on assets (ROA), CEO’s tenure (TEN), CEO’s age (AGE), 
CEO ownership (OWN), sales (NSA), and market risk beta (VOL) were excluded, resulting in 1641 initial 
sample firms. Next, we also excluded those firms with no or incomplete information on both R&D 
expenditure (XRD) and advertising expenditure (XAD), leading to 437 final sample firms that were used 
to estimate the simultaneous CEO compensation model (Eqs. (4.1)–(4.4)) and test the hypotheses 
presented in Section 2 above and Figure 1.  
 
MEASUREMENT OF VARIABLES 
 
Several previous studies that are useful and relevant to this paper are used as guidelines to measure 
the variables considered in the simultaneous CEO compensation model. They are listed in Table 1. 
CEO’s tenure (𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑁𝑁𝑖𝑖) is measured as the time duration during which an executive has served as a 
CEO. Net sales annual (𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝐴𝐴𝑖𝑖) is used as a proxy for firm size. Market risk (or volatility) (𝑉𝑉𝑅𝑅𝐿𝐿𝑖𝑖) is 
measured by beta. CEO ownership (𝑅𝑅𝑂𝑂𝑁𝑁𝑖𝑖) is measured by the value of shares (excluding options) 
owned by a CEO. CEO’s age (𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝑇𝑇𝑖𝑖) is measured in years. Industry control (𝐼𝐼𝑁𝑁𝐷𝐷𝑖𝑖) is a control variable 
for which we assign an ordinal code from 1 to 9 based on the first two-digit Global Industry 
Classification Standard (GICS) code provided by the database. The sample data involve 9 sectors, 
namely, Energy (10), Materials (15), Industrials (20), Consumer Discretionary (25), Consumer Staples 
(30), Health Care (35), Financials (40), Information Technology (45), and Telecommunication Services 
(50).  
Total CEO compensation (𝑇𝑇𝐶𝐶𝑖𝑖) comprises salary, bonus, other annual pay, total value of restricted 
stock grants, total value of stock options granted calculated by Black-Scholes, long term incentive pay 
(LTIP), and all other total pay. Return on assets (𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝐴𝐴𝑖𝑖) is used as a proxy for firm performance, 
measured as the ratio of net income to total assets. R&D intensity (𝑅𝑅𝐷𝐷𝑖𝑖) is measured as the ratio of 
R&D expenditure to sales. Advertising intensity (𝐴𝐴𝐷𝐷𝑖𝑖) is measured as the ratio of advertising 




The summary statistics for the endogenous variables and exogenous variables and the correlation 










Table 3. Summary Statistics for the Exogenous and Endogenous Variables in the SES Model 
Variable TEN NSA VOL OWN AGE IND TC ROA RD AD 
Mean 8.476 96.701 1.071 5.589 56.236 5.542 6.450 5.845 6.176 2.366 
Std. dev. 7.525 312.974 0.457 59.270 7.328 1.955 6.329 10.021 8.813 3.788 
 
Table 4. Correlation Matrix for the Exogenous and Endogenous Variables in the SES Model 
𝝆𝝆�𝒋𝒋𝒋𝒋′  TEN NSA VOL OWN AGE IND TC ROA RD AD 
TEN 1 –0.093 –0.012 0.194 0.390 0.046 –0.065 –0.121 0.108 –0.091 
NSA  1 –0.081 0.074 0.076 –0.047 0.267 0.065 –0.089 –0.013 
VOL   1 0.039 –0.040 –0.080 0.019 –0.080 0.035 –0.006 
OWN    1 0.023 0.090 0.394 0.037 0.074 –0.025 
AGE     1 –0.196 0.024 –0.039 –0.138 –0.033 
IND      1 –0.004 –0.120 0.570 –0.030 
TC       1 0.135 0.026 0.101 
ROA        1 –0.243 –0.001 
RD         1 –0.094 
AD          1 
5% critical value (two-tailed) = 0.0938 for n = 437. 
 
In Table 3, the average CEO’s tenure (TEN) is 8.476 years. The average sales (NSA) is 96.701 hundred 
million dollars. The average market risk (VOL) is 1.071 beta deciles. The average CEO ownership (OWN) 
is 5.589 million dollars. The average CEO’s age (AGE) is 56.236 years. The average CEO compensation 
(TC) is 6.450 million dollars. The average return on assets (ROA) is 5.845 return per asset. The average 
R&D intensity (RD) is 6.176 R&D spending per sale. The average advertising intensity (AD) is 2.366.  
In Table 3, sales (NSA) have the largest standard deviation 312.974 because NSA is skewed by some 
firms with extremely large sales compared with the rest of the sampled firms. CEO ownership (OWN) 
has the second largest standard deviation 59.270 due to the fact that OWN is skewed by some CEOs 
holding considerable amount of shares compared with the rest of the sample CEOs. Return on assets 
(ROA) has the third largest standard deviation 10.021 on the ground that ROA is skewed by some firms 
with extremely low negative performance compared with the rest of the sample firms. We can 
observe from Table 4 that the sample data do not have the multicollinearity problem.  
 
ESTIMATION RESULTS AND A COMPARISON OF THE OLS, 2SLS, AND 3SLS ESTIMATES 
 
The structural coefficients of the simultaneous CEO compensation model consisting of Eqs. (4.1) – (4.4) 
are estimated by OLS, 2SLS, and 3SLS. 3SLS becomes more efficient than 2SLS if the cross-equation 
error terms 𝜀𝜀 are correlated (Zellner & Theil, 1962). Table 5 reports the estimation results by OLS, 2SLS, 













Table 5. Coefficient Estimates for the Structural-Form of the SES Model 
Hypothesis 1A 1B 2A 2B 3 4A 4B 5 
Coefficient 𝛽𝛽32  𝛽𝛽32 𝛽𝛽33 𝛽𝛽33 𝛽𝛽34 𝛽𝛽24 𝛽𝛽24 𝛽𝛽42 
Sign + – + – – + – – 
OLS 0.087 0.087 –0.002 –0.002 0.224 –0.001 –0.001 –0.021 
2SLS –0.334 –0.334 0.002 0.002 –4.371 0.001 0.001 –0.011 
3SLS –0.179 –0.179 0.010** 0.010** –0.068 –0.015 –0.015 –0.006 
Hypothesis 6A 6B 7 8 9 10 11  
Coefficient 𝛽𝛽31 𝛽𝛽31 𝛽𝛽41 𝛽𝛽22 𝛽𝛽23 𝛽𝛽21 𝛽𝛽11  
Sign + – + + + + +  
OLS –0.201*** –0.201*** –0.003 -0.285*** –0.105 0.233** 0.086**  
2SLS –2.889** –2.889** 0.113 –0.189 2.794 0.277 0.641***  
3SLS –2.577** –2.577** 0.145* –0.225† 2.348** 0.613*** 0.647***  
† marginally significant at the 0.1 level; * significant at the 0.05 level; ** significant at the 0.01 level; and *** significant at 
the 0.001 level.  
 
In the first place, we observe from Table 5 that four of the OLS signs that are underlined (𝛽𝛽34, 𝛽𝛽41, 
𝛽𝛽22, 𝛽𝛽23) are contrary to the expected signs. All of the 2SLS and 3SLS signs match the expected 
directions except 𝛽𝛽22 which will be discussed in Section 5. The four abnormal signs are caused by the 
simultaneity and endogeneity biases arising from the inappropriate application of OLS to estimate Eqs. 
(4.1) – (4.4). Thus, we conclude that 2SLS and 3SLS are more appropriate than OLS for estimating the 
structural Eqs. (4.1) – (4.4) of the simultaneous CEO compensation model presented in Figure 1.  
In the second place, we also can observe from Table 5 that 3SLS is more efficient than 2SLS. There 
are seven significant 3SLS structural coefficients estimates (including marginally significant) compared 
to two significant 2SLS structural coefficients estimates. This suggests that some other contextual 
criteria variables are unintentionally omitted from the simultaneous CEO compensation model, 
because it is theoretically and practically impossible to include all contextual criteria variables.  
In the third and final place, the 2SLS and 3SLS estimates of the reduced-form coefficients of Eqs. 
(4.5) – (4.8) can be obtained via the relationship between the structural coefficients and the reduced-
form coefficients (see Kmenta, 1997; Lin and Shao, 2000; Greene, 2012). Table 6 presents the estimates 
of each equation of the reduced form separately, obtained by 2SLS and 3SLS; and Table 7 provides a 
summary of the 2SLS and 3SLS coefficient estimates of the reduced form. Then, Table 8 presents the 
total effect of one exogenous contextual criteria variable upon each and every endogenous variable 














Table 6. The 2SLS and 3SLS Estimated Results of Each Equation of the Reduced Form Eqs. (4.5) – (4.8) 
2SLS Estimates 3SLS Estimates 
𝑇𝑇𝐶𝐶�𝑖𝑖 = 2.046− 1.004𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑁𝑁𝑖𝑖 + 0.007𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝐴𝐴𝑖𝑖 
−13.156𝑉𝑉𝑅𝑅𝐿𝐿𝑖𝑖 − 0.018𝑅𝑅𝑂𝑂𝑁𝑁𝑖𝑖 
+0.485𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝑇𝑇𝑖𝑖 − 0.151𝐼𝐼𝑁𝑁𝐷𝐷𝑖𝑖 
𝑇𝑇𝐶𝐶�𝑖𝑖 = 6.188− 0.082𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑁𝑁𝑖𝑖 + 0.005𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝐴𝐴𝑖𝑖 
−0.031𝑉𝑉𝑅𝑅𝐿𝐿𝑖𝑖 + 0.030𝑅𝑅𝑂𝑂𝑁𝑁𝑖𝑖 
+0.031𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝑇𝑇𝑖𝑖  − 0.240𝐼𝐼𝑁𝑁𝐷𝐷𝑖𝑖 
𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝐴𝐴�𝑖𝑖 = −1.020− 1.565𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑁𝑁𝑖𝑖 + 0.010𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝐴𝐴𝑖𝑖 
−20.509𝑉𝑉𝑅𝑅𝐿𝐿𝑖𝑖 − 0.027𝑅𝑅𝑂𝑂𝑁𝑁𝑖𝑖 
+0.757𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝑇𝑇𝑖𝑖 − 0.235𝐼𝐼𝑁𝑁𝐷𝐷𝑖𝑖 
𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝐴𝐴�𝑖𝑖 = 5.440 − 0.127𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑁𝑁𝑖𝑖 + 0.007𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝐴𝐴𝑖𝑖 
−048𝑉𝑉𝑅𝑅𝐿𝐿𝑖𝑖 + 0.047𝑅𝑅𝑂𝑂𝑁𝑁𝑖𝑖 
+0.047𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝑇𝑇𝑖𝑖 − 0.372𝐼𝐼𝑁𝑁𝐷𝐷𝑖𝑖 
𝑅𝑅𝐷𝐷�𝑖𝑖 = 33.302 + 4.188𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑁𝑁𝑖𝑖 − 0.028𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝐴𝐴𝑖𝑖 
+54.873𝑉𝑉𝑅𝑅𝐿𝐿𝑖𝑖 + 0.079𝑅𝑅𝑂𝑂𝑁𝑁𝑖𝑖 
−2.186𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝑇𝑇𝑖𝑖 + 0.680𝐼𝐼𝑁𝑁𝐷𝐷𝑖𝑖 
𝑅𝑅𝐷𝐷�𝑖𝑖 = 7.860 + 0.148𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑁𝑁𝑖𝑖 − 0.008𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝐴𝐴𝑖𝑖 
+0.056− 0.120𝑅𝑅𝑂𝑂𝑁𝑁𝑖𝑖 
−0.122𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝑇𝑇𝑖𝑖 + 0.859𝐼𝐼𝑁𝑁𝐷𝐷𝑖𝑖 
𝐴𝐴𝐷𝐷�𝑖𝑖 = 2.182− 0.178𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑁𝑁𝑖𝑖 + 0.001𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝐴𝐴𝑖𝑖 
−2.326𝑉𝑉𝑅𝑅𝐿𝐿𝑖𝑖 − 0.003𝑅𝑅𝑂𝑂𝑁𝑁𝑖𝑖 
+0.075𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝑇𝑇𝑖𝑖 − 0.023𝐼𝐼𝑁𝑁𝐷𝐷𝑖𝑖 
𝐴𝐴𝐷𝐷�𝑖𝑖 = 2.388− 0.018𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑁𝑁𝑖𝑖 + 0.001𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝐴𝐴𝑖𝑖 
−0.007𝑉𝑉𝑅𝑅𝐿𝐿𝑖𝑖 + 0.007𝑅𝑅𝑂𝑂𝑁𝑁𝑖𝑖 
+0.005𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝑇𝑇𝑖𝑖 − 0.004𝐼𝐼𝑁𝑁𝐷𝐷𝑖𝑖 




































Table 7. A Summary of the 2SLS’ and 3SLS’ Coefficient Estimates of the Reduced Form of the SES Model 
 Coefficient Estimate 
Reduced-Form Coefficient by 2SLS by 3SLS 
𝛑𝛑𝟏𝟏𝟏𝟏 2.046 6.188 
𝛑𝛑𝟏𝟏𝟏𝟏 –1.004 –0.082 
𝛑𝛑𝟏𝟏𝟏𝟏 0.007 0.005 
𝛑𝛑𝟏𝟏𝟏𝟏 –13.156 –0.031 
𝛑𝛑𝟏𝟏𝟏𝟏 –0.018 0.030 
𝛑𝛑𝟏𝟏𝟏𝟏 0.485 0.031 
𝛑𝛑𝟏𝟏𝟏𝟏 –0.151 –0.240 
𝛑𝛑𝟏𝟏𝟏𝟏 –1.020 5.440 
𝛑𝛑𝟏𝟏𝟏𝟏 –1.565 –0.127 
𝛑𝛑𝟏𝟏𝟏𝟏 0.010 0.007 
𝛑𝛑𝟏𝟏𝟏𝟏 –20.509 –0.048 
𝛑𝛑𝟏𝟏𝟏𝟏 –0.027 0.047 
𝛑𝛑𝟏𝟏𝟏𝟏 0.757 0.047 
𝛑𝛑𝟏𝟏𝟏𝟏 –0.235 –0.372 
𝛑𝛑𝟏𝟏𝟏𝟏 33.302 7.860 
𝛑𝛑𝟏𝟏𝟏𝟏 4.188 0.148 
𝛑𝛑𝟏𝟏𝟏𝟏 –0.028 –0.008 
𝛑𝛑𝟏𝟏𝟏𝟏 54.873 0.056 
𝛑𝛑𝟏𝟏𝟏𝟏 0.079 –0.120 
𝛑𝛑𝟏𝟏𝟏𝟏 –2.186 –0.122 
𝛑𝛑𝟏𝟏𝟏𝟏 0.680 0.958 
𝛑𝛑𝟏𝟏𝟏𝟏 2.182 2.388 
𝛑𝛑𝟏𝟏𝟏𝟏 –0.178 –0.018 
𝛑𝛑𝟏𝟏𝟏𝟏 0.001 0.001 
𝛑𝛑𝟏𝟏𝟏𝟏 –2.326 –0.007 
𝛑𝛑𝟏𝟏𝟏𝟏 –0.003 0.007 
𝛑𝛑𝟏𝟏𝟏𝟏 0.075 0.005 
𝛑𝛑𝟏𝟏𝟏𝟏 –0.023 –0.004 
 
Table 8. Total Effects 
Jointly Determined Endogenous Variable 
Structural Form Reduced Form 
2SLS 3SLS 2SLS 3SLS 
CEO compensation (TC) 0.641 0.647 –13.837 –0.287 
Firm performance (ROA) 2.883 2.721 –21.569 –0.446 
R&D intensity (RD) –7.592 –2.814 57.606 0.912 
Advertising intensity (AD) 0.105 0.189 –2.454 –0.021 
 
 




Now, we observe from Table 7 that 3SLS differs from 2SLS in the signs of 𝜋𝜋14, 𝜋𝜋20, 𝜋𝜋24, 𝜋𝜋34, and 
𝜋𝜋44., that the signs of the estimates of other elements of Π  match between 2SLS and 3SLS, and that 
all the signs of the 2SLS and 3SLS estimates of the elements of Π  are consistent with the expected 
directions, except for 𝜋𝜋15, 𝜋𝜋25, 𝜋𝜋33, and 𝜋𝜋45. From the theoretical and empirical points of view, it is 
difficult to decide whether 3SLS is better than 2SLS for the reduced-form coefficients and the total 
effect estimation. However, since 3SLS indeed performs more efficiently than 2SLS for the structural-
form coefficients estimation, we conclude that, overall, 3SLS is a better choice than 2SLS for the 





EFFECTS OF CONTEXTUAL CRITERIA 
 
First of all, we find that CEO’s tenure as a contextual criterion has a negative effect on R&D intensity. 
Because the sign does not match the theoretical prediction of Hypothesis 1A, Hypothesis 1A is not 
supported. Although the negative sign matches the theoretical prediction of Hypothesis 1B, it is not 
significant. Thus, Hypothesis 1B is also not supported. However, the 3SLS insignificant and negative 
estimate is consistent with the regression results of Barker and Mueller’s (2002) Models 2 and 3 
(p.794).  
Secondly, firm size (sales) has a significant and positive impact upon R&D intensity at the 1% level 
(𝛽𝛽33 = 0.010 from 3SLS). Thus, Hypothesis 2A is supported by the 3SLS estimate. However, Hypothesis 
2B is not supported empirically. Our positive and significant estimate is consistent with the resource-
based view theory (Schumpeter, 1942; Galbraith, 1952; Arrow, 1962), but it is contrary to Barker and 
Mueller’s (2002) finding of a negative relationship between firm size and R&D intensity in their main 
regressions (Models 1–3) (p.794). As such, our result suggests that larger firms are capable of investing 
more in R&D because they have adequate resources and substantial power to initiate R&D projects, 
successfully commercialize new products, and protect them from imitation.   
Thirdly, market risk (beta) has a negative effect on R&D intensity. The sign is as expected but it is 
not significant. Thus, Hypothesis 3 is not supported statistically. Our result is consistent with Lee’s 
(2009) estimate based on fixed effects models filled into a panel data set.    
Fourthly, CEO ownership has a negative impact on firm performance measured as ROA. The sign is 
at variance with the theoretical prediction of Hypothesis 4A. Thus, Hypothesis 4A is not supported by 
our empirical estimate. Furthermore, although the sign matches the theoretical prediction of 
Hypothesis 4B, it is not significant. Thus, Hypothesis 4B is also not supported. The sign confirms 
Welbourne and Cyr’s (1996) finding of a negative relationship between CEO ownership and firm 
performance, but it is contrary to what Lilienfeld-Toal and Ruenzi (2014) have discovered.  
Fifthly and finally, CEO’s Age has a negative effect on advertising intensity (AD). The negative sign 
meets the theoretical expectation, but the estimate is statistically insignificant. Thus, Hypothesis 5 is 
not supported. 
 
SIMULTANEOUS RELATIONSHIPS: MANAGERIAL DISCRETION, FIRM PERFORMANCE, AND CEO PAY 
 
Both the 2SLS estimate (𝛽𝛽31 = −2.889 ∗∗) and 3SLS estimate (𝛽𝛽31 = −2.577 ∗∗) at the 1% level of 
significance strongly suggest that firm performance (ROA) has a significant and negative effect on 
R&D intensity, thereby confirming Hypothesis 6B but rejecting Hypothesis 6A. This finding implies that 
turning around poor performance is a strong incentive for R&D investment, which is consistent with 
conventional wisdom of Cyert and March (1963).  




Firm performance (ROA) has a significant and positive impact on advertising intensity (AD) at the 
5% level (𝛽𝛽41 = 0.145 ∗ from 3SLS). Hence, Hypothesis 7 is supported by the 3SLS estimate. This finding 
suggests that advertising is the main route for high-performing firms to sustain market superiority and 
profitability. Note that this is an example where Hypothesis 7 would be rejected if the insignificant 
2SLS estimate (0.113) were applied.  
R&D intensity has a marginally significant and negative effect on firm performance at the 10% level 
(𝛽𝛽22 = −0.225 † from 3SLS). Thus, Hypothesis 8 is marginally not supported by the empirical estimate. 
This finding seems to contradict conventional thinking and intuition and is contrary to Lee’s (2009) 
discovery. But, it becomes logical if we consider Hypothesis 6B and Hypothesis 8 jointly. When 
performance is low, firms will invest more in R&D hoping to boost performance. However, as R&D 
investment increases, our simultaneous equations model predicts decreasing performance. Logically, 
firms will reduce R&D expenditure. Therefore, R&D spending appears to be an inverted U-shape 
relating to firm performance. This is consistent with the finding of Yeh, et al. (2010). The relationship 
between R&D intensity and firm performance is not simple, causal and direct as suggested by both 
Lee (2009) and Beneda and Zhang (2011). Instead, it is quite complex as evidenced by the simultaneous 
CEO compensation model developed in this paper. This again affirms that top management team 
(TMT) has to consider managerial discretion (e.g., R&D investment) and firm performance 
simultaneously and jointly. Note that this is a second instance where Hypothesis 8 would be rejected 
outright by the insignificant 2SLS estimate (–0.189) and decisively supported by the OLS estimate (–
0.285***).   
Advertising has a significant and positive impact on firm performance (ROA) at the 1% level (𝛽𝛽23 =
2.348 ∗∗ from 3SLS). Accordingly, H9 is firmly supported by the 3SLS estimate. This is consistent with 
Shepherd’s (1972) empirical result but contrary to Lee’s (2009). Our finding confirms Shepherd’s (1972) 
claim that advertising is a market barrier factor for profitability. It is noted that this is a third example 
where H9 would be rejected, provided that the insignificant 2SLS estimate (2.794) were utilized.  
CEO compensation has a significant and positive effect on firm performance (ROA) at the 0.1% level 
(𝛽𝛽21 = 0.613 ∗∗∗ from 3SLS). Thus, Hypothesis 10 is supported by the 3SLS estimate. This evidence 
suggests that although solving the issue of pay inequality is important, restraining too much on CEO 
compensation might adversely affect firm performance, which consequently might lead to economic 
downturn. Once more, this is a fourth (final) example where H10 would be rejected, should the 
insignificant 2SLS estimate (0.277) be applied.  
Firm performance (ROA) has a significant and positive impact on CEO compensation at the 0.1% 
level (𝛽𝛽11 = 0.641 ∗∗∗ from 2SLS and 𝛽𝛽11 = 0.647 ∗∗∗ from 3SLS). Therefore, Hypothesis 11 is 
supported. This is consistent with the agency theorists’ assertion that performance is a strong 
incentive alignment mechanism tying CEO’s interests with shareholder’s interests and CEOs indeed are 
paid for performance (Kaplan, 2008). But, it is contrary to the findings of Finkelstein and Boyd (1998) 
and Tosi, et al. (2000). Our finding suggests that the relationship between firm performance and CEO 
compensation is not so simple and direct as suggested by previous studies and that this relationship 
must be considered simultaneously and jointly with managerial discretion under the impact of the 
contextual criteria as implied by the proposed simultaneous CEO compensation model estimated by a 
more rigid and appropriate 3SLS method, rather than a 2SLS or an OLS estimation. The SES model has 
shown to be a better alternative to explaining the cause-and-effect relationships between managerial 
discretion and firm performance, between firm performance and CEO compensation, and between 
managerial discretion and CEO compensation.  
Figure 2 illustrates the simultaneous CEO compensation model with the hypotheses and the 
corresponding structural coefficient estimates from 3SLS. 
 
 






Figure 2. Hypotheses and 3SLS Coefficient Estimates of the Simultaneous Compensation Model 
 
TOTAL EFFECTS OF EXOGENOUS VARIABLES ON THE JOINTLY-DETERMINED ENDOGENOUS VARIABLES 
 
As mentioned earlier, Table 7 presents the total effects of exogenous variables on the jointly-
determined endogenous variables, which are computed based on the structural and reduced-form 
coefficient estimates from 2SLS and 3SLS.  
The structural (or direct) total effect on a jointly-determined endogenous variable includes the 
effect of other endogenous variable(s) and the exogenous contextual criteria variable(s) present in a 
given equation. In comparison, the reduced (or indirect) total effect on a jointly-determined 
endogenous variable includes the combined effects of all the exogenous contextual criteria variables 
in the simultaneous CEO compensation model. The difference between 2SLS and 3SLS is smaller in the 
structural form than in the reduced form, since the structural form indicates the direct summed effects 
of the variables in a given equation related to that endogenous variable whereas the reduced form 
shows the indirect compound effects of all the exogenous contextual criteria variables on each and 
every endogenous variable.  




For CEO compensation (TC), the structural total effect (0.641 from 2SLS and 0.647 from 3SLS) is the 
same as the direct effect of firm performance (ROA), because firm performance (ROA) is the only 




We can draw several managerial implications for board of director (BOD), top management team 
(TMT), chief executive officer (CEO), and policy maker. First and most importantly, this study confirms 
the positive contribution of firm performance to CEO compensation and the positive reverse impact 
of CEO compensation on firm performance. Hence, on the one hand, CEO compensation committee 
and other concerned parties should pay close attention to CEO’s performance contingent on the 
managerial decisions and contextual criteria. On the other, overly restraining the CEO pay might 
adversely affect firm performance.   
Such a need for attention to performance is especially critical when performance is jointly 
considered with managerial discretion and strategic choices, such as R&D investment and advertising 
expenditure. Even though the feedback loop is positive between advertising spending and firm 
performance, it is negative between R&D investment and firm performance. Therefore, CEOs should 
restrain from investing too much in R&D and seek out the most optimal, efficient, and cost-effective 
R&D spending threshold based on management studies (e.g., Yeh, et al., 2010) and job experience.  
Managers should also focus on firm size that as a contextual criterion has a significant direct and 
indirect effect on R&D and advertising decisions, firm performance, and CEO compensation which are 
jointly determined. Too big of a firm size might entice CEOs to invest too much in R&D, which would 
lead to poor performance and consequently pay decrease. Hence, firm size does matter in firm 
performance but it should not be considered alone. Instead, it must be considered carefully and jointly 
with R&D, advertising, and CEO compensation. 
 
CONCLUSIONS AND PROPOSING A MAJOR EXTENSION FOR FURTHER RESEARCH 
 
The agency theory predicts a positive effect of firm performance on CEO compensation, while the 
managerial entrenchment theory claims a negative effect and even no effect of firm performance on 
CEO compensation. Although many studies have been conducted, the debate on the relationship 
between firm performance and CEO compensation is still ongoing. We contribute to the literature by 
pointing out two important aspects overlooked by previous studies. First, the complex relationships 
among CEO pay, firm performance, and other relevant variables are not so simple, casual, and direct 
(or sequential) as suggested by previous studies. Instead, it is simultaneously and jointly determined 
along with managerial discretion such as R&D and advertising intensity. Second, the jointly-
determined managerial discretion, firm performance, and CEO compensation should not be taken for 
granted and must be scrutinized under the direct and indirect impact of the contextual criteria. To 
bridge these two research gaps, a simultaneous CEO compensation model based on established 
management theories, psychology theories of motivation, and the results of previous studies is 
proposed and empirically tested to examine the proposition that the relationships among managerial 
discretion, firm performance, and CEO compensation are not sequential but rather simultaneously and 
jointly determined.  
The three-stage least squares (3SLS) estimation results confirm a positive feedback loop between 
firm performance and CEO compensation, a positive feedback loop between firm performance and 
advertising intensity, and a negative feedback loop between firm performance and R&D intensity. The 
empirical evidence implies that the positive relationship between firm performance and CEO 
compensation is contingent upon the appropriateness of the strategic choices that CEOs make and 




that excessive R&D investment will hurt firm performance rather than help it. As such, it is important 
that managers find an optimal, efficient, and cost-effective R&D spending threshold. Moreover, the 
3SLS results indicate a significant and positive impact of firm size on R&D intensity. But, managers 
should resist the temptation of abundant resources available from large size to spend too much on 
R&D, which results in poor performance and low pay.   
We conclude this study by suggesting that the cause-and-effect (interdependence or two-way) 
approach is in sharp contrast to the sequential (causality or one-way) approach and that the former is 
superior for understanding the simultaneous relationships among managerial discretion, firm 
performance, and CEO compensation in applied research of executive compensation and leadership. 
This study answers the call of new, rigorous and sophisticated methodology for CEO compensation 
research (Frydman & Jenter, 2010; Devers et al., 2007) and CEO hiring research (Shi & de Jong, 2020). 
We hope that more studies answering this call are forthcoming.  
Finally, as a major and important extension to this study for future research, we propose to 
construct a dynamic simultaneous equations system (DSES) in line with the methodological and 
empirical studies by Theil and Boot (1962), Theil (1971), Zellner and Palm (1974), and Lin (1987, 1992). 
Based on the DSES, we will be able to analyze the initial, cumulated, and total effects of varying 
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